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“THE ONLY THING WE HAVE TO FEAR IS 
FEAR ITSELF”: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
INFIRMITIES WITH FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND CITING FEAR 
AS THE RATIONALE FOR DEPRIVING 
FELONS OF THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE 
Erika Stern∗ 
          Felon disenfranchisement, a mechanism by which felons and 
former felons are deprived of their right to vote, is a widespread 
practice that has been challenged on many grounds. However, felon 
disenfranchisement has not yet been properly challenged under the 
First Amendment. This Article argues that states implicate felons’ First 
Amendment rights through felon disenfranchisement without citing 
adequate or compelling rationales to justify this severe intrusion. In 
fact, at least one rationale, a rationale based on the fear of the way 
felons might vote, is itself inconsistent with First Amendment principles. 
Disenfranchising felons based on a fear of the way that felons might 
vote is contrary to the First Amendment, which partially sought to 
protect unpopular speech. Because courts in other voting rights cases 
have deemed similar rationales unconstitutional, this Article suggests 
that courts should reach the same result in felon disenfranchisement 
cases. Once courts recognize that this distrust-based rationale is 
inconsistent with First Amendment principles, states should critically 
consider whether other rationales are compelling enough to justify a 
complete denial of felons’ right to vote. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
At President Roosevelt’s inaugural speech in 1933, he stated: 
“[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself . . . .”1 While 
Roosevelt was referring to economic hardship,2 his quotation is 
fitting when used to analyze felon disenfranchisement, including the 
constitutional inconsistencies with citing fear of how felons might 
vote as a rationale for felon disenfranchisement. Taking the advice of 
President Roosevelt, state and federal legislatures should not fear 
felons and the way they might vote, but should instead be afraid of 
“fear itself.” It is fear itself that makes state and federal legislatures 
overlook the constitutional problems with citing fear as a reason for 
silencing felons’ votes.3 It is fear itself that has contributed to the 
disenfranchisement of 5.85 million Americans in the November 2012 
presidential election for no constitutionally sound reason.4 
Felon disenfranchisement is a mechanism through which states 
deny individuals their right to vote purely because of prior felony 
convictions.5 The term “disenfranchised felon” encompasses all 
individuals who have been disqualified from voting on the basis of a 
felony conviction. This characterization has the potential to include 
those who have served their sentences and those who are still 
incarcerated, individuals who have committed only one offense and 
those who have committed multiple offenses,6 and finally, those who 
have committed election-related offenses and those whose crimes are 
unrelated to elections.7 Yet, despite their differences, these 
individuals are, at least temporarily, almost universally denied what 
most courts have deemed a basic and fundamental right—the right to 
vote.8 
1. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in Text of the
Inaugural Address; President for Vigorous Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1933, at 1. 
2. See id.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Nov.
2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinus_Nov2012.pdf 
[hereinafter Felony Disenfranchisement Laws]. 
5. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003).
6. See id.
7. Scott M. Bennett, Giving Ex-Felons the Right to Vote, 6 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, ¶ 20
(2004). 
8. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
Spring 2015] FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 707 
Currently, Maine and Vermont are the only two states that never 
disenfranchise individuals because of a felony conviction.9 The 
forty-eight states that do disenfranchise felons10 implement differing 
restrictions on felons’ right to vote.11 Some states only temporarily 
disenfranchise felons, while others never allow felons to regain their 
right to vote.12 Interestingly, “ex-felons in the eleven states that 
disenfranchise people after they have completed their sentences 
make up about 45 percent of the entire disenfranchised population, 
totaling over 2.6 million people.”13 
Many state and federal representatives support felon 
disenfranchisement measures because felons’ interests conflict with 
states’ interests in maintaining an orderly and crime-free 
environment.14 State courts have further concluded that felons and 
ex-felons, if able to vote, might vote in a way that makes it easier for 
them to commit more crimes with fewer consequences.15 States fear 
that if felons can vote, an orderly state will become a lawless 
society.16 Wishing to maintain what courts have termed the “purity 
of the ballot box,”17 states claim that felon disenfranchisement is 
justified. 
The rationale that states and the federal government give for 
disenfranchising felons is similar to the rationale legislators gave for 
disenfranchising women, minority groups, and individuals with low 
socioeconomic statuses.18 In implementing these restrictions, 
legislators considered these groups unworthy of obtaining the right to 
vote19 and feared that these individuals would vote in an unfavorable 
9. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
10. Hereinafter, the term felon will encompass felons and former felons.
11. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
12. Id.
13. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF 
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 1 (2012). 
14. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81 (1974).
15. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
16. See id.
17. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Washington v.
State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884)). 
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 981–87 (observing that women did not need 
an individual right to vote because women were represented by their husbands). 
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way.20 Although constitutional amendments have eliminated most 
discriminatory tactics that regulate an individual’s right to vote, felon 
disenfranchisement is still a way in which states can discriminate 
against particular individuals for fear of their unfavorable votes.21 
This discrimination is inconsistent with the First Amendment, which 
was created in part to protect unpopular speech and to allow an 
unpopular minority to speak out against a majority.22 
Because felon disenfranchisement is a long-standing and 
widespread practice,23 one might anticipate that the rationale for 
denying felons this fundamental right is well thought-out, adequately 
supported, non-discriminatory, and within the spirit of the U.S. 
Constitution.24 Troublingly, most of the rationales cited by courts 
suggest that felon disenfranchisement is just another mechanism 
through which states can discriminate against certain individuals 
whom they do not trust.25 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the forty-eight states that 
disenfranchise felons should follow Vermont and Maine in 
recognizing that there is no justifiable reason to deny felons their 
right to vote.26 If for no other purpose, those forty-eight states should 
at least give felons the right to vote to see if there really is any reason 
to distrust felons’ votes, because no study yet has found that felons 
vote differently than non-felons.27 The states should realize also that 
20. See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910 70 (1974) 
(explaining voting restrictions targeting poor whites and African Americans). 
21. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81 (1974).
22. Tom Donnelly, A Popular Approach to Popular Constitutionalism: The First Civic
Education, and Constitutional Change, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 321, 328–30 (2010). 
23. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
24. See infra Part IV (suggesting that this is not the case).
25. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 81 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Joseph
Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1341 (2011) 
(citing ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 105–71 (2000)). 
26. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
27. See Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda For Demolition”: The Fallacy and the Danger of The
“Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
109, 125 (2004) (citing Vanessa Gezari, Go to Jail, Get to Vote—in Maine or Vermont, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 2004, at 1A) (explaining that inmates often have the same political 
concerns as other American citizens and would vote similarly); see also id. (citing Pam Belluck, 
When the Voting Bloc Lives Inside a Cellblock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A12) (noting that a 
considerable number of inmates would vote conservatively if given the opportunity to do so, 
despite the general assumption that inmates would vote liberally); id. (citing JONATHAN D. 
CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 146, 146–51 (1972) 
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denying felons the right to vote for fear that they will vote differently 
than non-felons is comparable to a republican trying to silence a 
democrat’s vote or vice versa. Because holding otherwise would 
violate felons’ First Amendment rights, the United States must give 
felons an outlet to express their opinions on important issues instead 
of following the historical trend of searching for ways to silence 
individuals’ opinions without adequate justification.28 
Part II discusses the background and rationale legislators cite for 
felon-disenfranchisement statutes and prior voting restrictions. Part 
III explores First Amendment values and proposes that a First 
Amendment analysis of felon disenfranchisement statutes is 
appropriate because courts have used the First Amendment to 
analyze other voting restrictions. Part IV examines the states’ 
rationale that felons cannot be trusted to vote and demonstrates that, 
because courts have deemed this rationale to be problematic in other 
contexts, it is not sufficient to justify the severe sanction of felon 
disenfranchisement. Part V examines Maine and Vermont’s approach 
to felon disenfranchisement and proposes that other states should 
follow Maine and Vermont’s lead, or at least recognize the 
constitutional problems with felon disenfranchisement and its 
rationale. Part VI concludes by recognizing that if felon 
disenfranchisement and the states’ rationale that felons cannot be 
trusted to vote are deemed inconsistent with First Amendment 
principles, there are few other justifications for denying felons the 
right to vote. This leaves courts with the question of whether there 
really is any valid rationale for disenfranchising felons. 
II. BACKGROUND: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND PRIOR VOTING RESTRICTIONS 
This part traces the history of felon disenfranchisement and prior 
voting restrictions. It discusses different rationales for 
disenfranchising felons and examines the root of the fear associated 
(explaining that criminals often acknowledge that they have done something wrong and believe 
the crimes that they have committed deserve to be punished, demonstrating that criminals’ 
interest might in fact mirror the interests of law-abiding citizens). 
28. While Ewald, in his article, “An Agenda for Demolition”: The Fallacy and the Danger
of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, has already (1) discussed 
the prevalence of the rationale that this Article criticizes, (2) demonstrated the inconsistencies of 
this rationale with universal suffrage, and (3) suggested that this rationale is flawed; this Article 
differs in that it analyzes this rationale under the first amendment. Ewald, supra note 27. 
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with felons’ votes, which was once cited as the rationale for prior 
voting restrictions. It demonstrates how courts, legislatures, and 
scholars attribute this fear to generalizations regarding felons’ voting 
behavior. 
A. Felon Disenfranchisement: From the Beginning
Felon disenfranchisement can be traced to ancient Greece, 
ancient Rome, and Medieval Europe, where individuals lost 
numerous rights as a result of their involvement in criminal 
activities.29 Individuals who committed crimes could not obtain 
property and were subject to banishment from their communities.30 
In addition, criminals lost their right to vote and were denied 
the opportunity to make public speeches.31 When felon 
disenfranchisement was first implemented in these civilizations, the 
judge would disenfranchise individuals only if he decided that the 
particular crime was serious enough to warrant this severe 
punishment.32 
Colonists implemented a similar version of felon 
disenfranchisement in the United States.33 Initially, the United States, 
like Europe, limited the scope of felon disenfranchisement by only 
disenfranchising individuals who had committed serious crimes.34 By 
the late nineteenth century, more than half of the states 
disenfranchised individuals who had committed serious offenses.35 
The scope of felon disenfranchisement continued to expand 
immensely over a short period of time36 to encompass crimes 
including minor drug offenses;37 today some individuals are 
disenfranchised for first-time offenses38 or misdemeanors.39 
29. Lauren Handelsman, Giving the Barking Dog A Bite: Challenging Felon
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1879 
(2005). 
30. Id.
31. Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059–60 (2002). 




36. Daniel S. Goldman, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and
Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REV. 611, 633 (2004). 
37. Id. at 634.
38. Handelsman, supra note 29, at 1879–80.
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Today, forty-eight states disenfranchise felons, making Maine 
and Vermont the only two states that allow felons to vote, even while 
they are incarcerated.40 Maine withholds the right to vote only from 
felons who are mentally ill and has no other laws restricting felons 
from voting.41 Although Maine’s voting rights statute does not 
expressly give felons the right to vote, it can be gleaned from the 
statute’s silence that felons are not prohibited from voting.42 
Vermont’s voting rights statute, on the other hand, expressly permits 
felons to vote.43 It does, however, disenfranchise individuals who 
have committed voting fraud or other related offenses.44 
In other states, many individuals are now disenfranchised for 
what the law considers “lesser” crimes, with very little explanation 
of why this disenfranchisement is necessary.45 The largest scope of 
such expansion has been disenfranchisement for drug-related 
crimes,46 which is largely a result of the war on drugs.47 The number 
of drug-related offenses has increased in the past thirty years, 
resulting in increased incarceration rates and increased 
disenfranchisement rates for these offenses.48 Yet, felon 
disenfranchisement was not initially used to disenfranchise 
individuals for drug-related offenses, but instead only to 
disenfranchise individuals who committed “serious offenses.”49 
39. See Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values:
Liberalizing Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 283, 288 n.16 (2007) (citing Ewald, supra note 31, at 1057 n.31) (“The phrase 
‘felon disenfranchisement’ is actually a bit of a misnomer because some states bar individuals 
convicted of certain misdemeanors.”). But see McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 
974–75 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (explaining that disenfranchising an individual for a misdemeanor 
violates the equal protection clause). 
40. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
41. Developments in the Law—One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1942 n.21 (2002) [hereinafter One Person, No 
Vote] (citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 115 (2008)). 
42. See White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 668, 685 (Me. 1974).
43. One Person, No Vote, supra note 41, at 1942 n.21 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 807(a) (2008)).
44. Brian J. Hancock, The Voting Rights of Convicted Felons, 17 J. ELECTION ADMIN. 35,
36 (1996). 
45. Handelsman, supra note 29, at 1879–80.
46. See Goldman, supra note 36, at 628.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Marc Mauer, Disenfranchisement of Felons: The Modern-Day Voting Rights
Challenge, 2002 C.R. J. 40, 41 (2002)). 
49. Handelsman, supra note 29, at 1879.
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While the large number of disenfranchised felons speaks for 
itself in terms of the lingering effect that felon disenfranchisement 
statutes have on felons, the statistics do not expressly speak to the 
effect that these statutes have on minority groups and individuals 
with low socioeconomic status. However, these statutes often have 
racially and economically discriminatory effects.50 For example, 7.7 
percent of African American adults are disenfranchised, compared to 
1.8 percent of the non-African American population.51 African 
Americans represent over one third (36 percent) of all 
disenfranchised felons.52 Additionally, nearly one million 
disenfranchised individuals are African American ex-felons who 
have already completed their sentences.53 Regardless of whether the 
disparate effect of felon disenfranchisement statutes results from 
discrimination in the criminal justice system54 or directly from the 
state felon disenfranchisement statutes,55 statistics demonstrate that 
felon disenfranchisement disproportionately affects minority 
groups.56 
B. Examination of Past Voting Restrictions
An understanding of previous voting rights cases will lead to a 
better understanding of felon disenfranchisement and the rationale 
cited to support this restriction. The rationale that the state and 
federal governments cite to support felon disenfranchisement is the 
same rationale cited to support previous voting restrictions: that the 
disenfranchised group cannot be trusted.57 This rationale was 
abandoned when such restrictions were deemed unconstitutional. 
50. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
51. Id.
52. JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE
IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998). 
53. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
54. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
district court erred by not considering racial bias in Washington’s criminal justice system in its 
consideration of whether the state’s disenfranchisement laws violated the Voting Rights Act). 
55. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224 (1985) (describing a statute designed by
state legislatures with the intent to disenfranchise African Americans that disenfranchised 
individuals who had committed crimes of “moral turpitude”). 
56. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
57. See infra Part II.B.
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1. Discrimination Against Non-Property Owners,
African Americans, and Women 
Property qualifications were an early mechanism used to limit 
the right to vote for certain individuals because many people did not 
trust non-property owners with the vote.58 While some feared that 
non-property owners would vote to advance only the interests of 
non-property owners,59 others feared that they lacked the ability to 
make their own independent decisions and accordingly should be 
represented by those who owned property.60 
Like non-property owners, African Americans were also denied 
the right to vote because state and federal legislatures did not trust 
them with such a right.61 Even the Fifteenth Amendment, which 
textually gave African Americans the right to vote in 1868, fell short 
of accomplishing its objective.62 Many southern states circumvented 
the Fifteenth Amendment’s intent by implementing restrictions and 
processes that effectively denied African Americans the right to vote 
because they feared the prospect of enfranchising African 
Americans.63 In particular, Southern Democrats feared the political 
weight of the African American vote during Reconstruction, as they 
feared that African Americans would take power away from rich 
white landowners.64 
Similarly, women struggled to obtain the right to vote for over 
seventy-five years.65 State legislatures feared the advancement of 
women’s political interests,66 arguing that the female vote would 
58. John Lawrence Hill, A Third Theory of Liberty: The Evolution of Our Conception of
Freedom in American Constitutional Thought, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 115, 151 & n.135 
(2002) (citing Morton White, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 261–65 (1978)). 
Federalists, like Adams and Hamilton, along with legal scholars, like Blackstone, accepted this 
rationale. Id. 
59. Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1509–10
(2002) (citing KEYSSAR, supra note 25, at 11). 
60. Id.
61. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS 29–32 (2004). 
62. Id. at 32–33.
63. Id. at 33–34.
64. Briffault, supra note 59, at 1515 (“Southern Democrats us[ed] gerrymandering,
complicated ballot configurations, administrative devices, and occasional violence and fraudulent 
vote counts to curtail black voting . . . .”). 
65. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 61, at 36.
66. See id.
714 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:703 
destroy the family unit.67 Also, state legislatures felt that women did 
not need the right to vote because their husbands adequately 
represented them in the political process.68 Southern white males also 
opposed female suffrage because they were afraid to give African 
American women the right to vote, thereby enfranchising even more 
African Americans than had previously been enfranchised through 
the Fifteenth Amendment.69 In 1874, even after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was implemented, the Court in Minor v. Happersett70 
held that denying women the right to vote was not inconsistent with 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause,71 seemingly deeming fear an 
appropriate basis for restricting voting rights. However, Congress 
ratified the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, and consequently 
women gained the right to vote.72 
2. Mechanisms for Discrimination
Voting restrictions were used to create what some considered “a 
more ‘qualified’ and more conservative electorate, and to weaken the 
political power of white Populists, small farmers, industrial workers, 
Republicans and other groups.”73 For example, secret ballots, a 
voting method adopted in the United States between 1884 and 1891, 
allowed anonymous voting, but adversely affected the African 
American vote.74 Although secret ballots are still used universally 
and are now commended for preventing corruption and coercion,75 
initially African Americans were given no assistance with the newly 
67. Sarah B. Lawsky, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act,
109 YALE L.J. 783, 790–91 (2000). 
68. Id. at 791 (explaining that “anti-suffragists” wanted to silence women and believed that
if women voted, their individual rather than familial interests would be expressed). 
69. Gregory S. Parks & Quinetta M. Roberson, “Eighteen Million Cracks”: Gender’s Role
in the 2008 Presidential Campaign, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 321, 340 (2011) (citing 
DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE 
LAW 120 (2004)). 
70. 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
71. The Privileges or Immunities Clause prevents states from implementing restrictions that
deny individuals the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. These privileges or immunities are rights that are essential and fundamental to 
being a citizen of the United States. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 55 (1872). The Court in 
Minor v. Happersett concluded that voting was not one of those rights fundamentally 
characteristic of the rights guaranteed to United States citizens. See Minor, 88 U.S. at 175. 
72. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 61, at 36.
73. Briffault, supra note 59, at 1516.
74. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 61, at 34.
75. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Bennett, 238 P.3d 619, 622 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc) (describing
secret ballots as tools implemented during elections to prevent voter coercion). 
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implemented secret-ballot voting process76 which required voters to 
place particular ballots in particular boxes in order for their vote to 
count.77 Because African Americans were denied educational 
opportunities and were inexperienced voters, this complex process, 
compounded with their inability to receive assistance, created a de 
facto restriction on African Americans’ right to vote.78 
Poll taxes⎯which discouraged and, in some cases, prevented 
poor individuals from voting⎯were another way in which southern 
state governments attempted to disenfranchise African American and 
poor White voters.79 Poll taxes were implemented in part to 
disenfranchise poor voters who “formed the backbone of the Populist 
party”—in other words, to disenfranchise individuals who might vote 
radically.80 In 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment deemed poll 
taxes unconstitutional for federal elections.81 Additionally, in 1966, 
the Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections82 held that 
poll taxes for state elections were inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83 
To preserve their political interests, dominant groups also 
supported literacy tests to deny certain groups the ability to obtain 
political power.84 These tests were especially used to discriminate 
against African Americans, who were previously denied the 
opportunity to obtain an education because of their status as slaves.85 
Grandfather clauses, which waived literacy requirements for those 
whose ancestors could vote, also disfavored African Americans, 




79. See id. at 31.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 242 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff’d 384 U.S.
155 (1966). 
81. Id. at 247.
82. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
83. Id. at 666.
84. Castro v. State, 466 P.2d 244, 249 n.13 (Cal. 1970) (citing Helen Sullivan, Literacy and
Illiteracy, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 511, 520 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 
1937)). 
85. Michael C. Dorf, Federal Governmental Power: The Voting Rights Act, 26 TOURO L.
REV. 505, 506 (2010) (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 219 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)); Daniel S. Goldman, The 
Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and Race Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 611, 624 (2004). 
86. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 61, at 35.
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Court deemed grandfather clauses unconstitutional in 1915 in Guinn 
v. United States.87 Further, in 1966 the Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach88 held that even though literacy tests were not facially
unconstitutional, a ban on literacy tests was an appropriate way to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.89 In 1970, the Court extended the
ban on literacy tests to the entire country, and this ban was made
permanent by 1975.90
Yet another tactic that states used to prevent certain 
“undesirable” groups from voting was the white primary. White 
primaries, which prohibited non-white voters from voting, were also 
used through the 1930s to disenfranchise African Americans because 
state legislatures did not want African Americans to be involved in 
the political process.91 In an attempt to escape the emerging 
restrictions on white primaries, state legislatures sought to allow 
political parties’ executive committees to implement a restriction 
during the pre-primary stage.92 Such tactics were based on the 
long-standing belief that these groups were unqualified to vote 
because of lack of education, as well as fear of the way that these 
groups would vote.93 Accordingly, despite the different mechanisms 
states implemented, these voting restrictions all had the same 
effect⎯to disenfranchise a particular group of individuals. 
C. Current Rationale for Felon Disenfranchisement
Proponents of felon disenfranchisement have offered multiple 
rationales for its practice. First, proponents are afraid of how felons 
will vote on substantive issues and the candidates that they might 
support. They fear that felons will somehow vote in a way that might 
make it easier for them to make their previous illegal activity now 
legal.94 Many states believe that criminals are less likely to be 
trustworthy, and as a result, these states support felon 
disenfranchisement.95 They often assert an “interest in preserving the 
87. 238 U.S. 347, 365 (1915).
88. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
89. Id. at 333–34.
90. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 61, at 35.
91. Id. at 462.
92. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 236–37 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
93. Briffault, supra note 59, at 1510.
94. Eric J. Miller, Foundering Democracy: Felon Disenfranchisement in the American
Tradition of Voter Exclusion, 19 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 32, 36 (2005). 
95. Id.
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integrity of [their] electoral process by removing from the process 
those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can 
be said to be destructive of society’s aims.”96 In citing this interest, 
states have equated felons to “idiots” and “the insane,” and courts 
have accepted this comparison.97 In sum, states believe that 
“[c]riminal disenfranchisement allows citizens to decide law 
enforcement issues without the dilution of voters who are 
deemed . . . to be less trustworthy.”98 
The states’ rationale that felons cannot be trusted with the right 
to vote dates back to the implementation of section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.99 Justice Marshall argued that 
Congress had this rationale in mind while drafting section 2, which 
addresses how states should apportion electoral votes when they 
disenfranchise felons.100 Justice Marshall asserted that Congress’s 
intention was not to disenfranchise felons but to reduce 
representation of the southern states.101 Ultimately, Justice Marshall 
believed that Congress was afraid that voters in southern states, and 
particularly African Americans, would overwhelm the voting 
population and vote in a way that would weaken Congress’s own 
political interests.102 
Second, proponents of felon disenfranchisement fear that felons 
will violate voting procedures and commit voter fraud if given the 
opportunity to vote.103 Third, many states rely on John Locke’s 
concept of the social contract, a theory that discusses how when 
individuals enter society, they authorize the legislature to make laws 
and have the ability to contribute to the law-making process through 
96. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
97. Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 36, at 642 (quoting Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d
1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
98. Bennett, supra note 7, at ¶ 21 (quoting Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of
1999: Hearing on H.R. Res. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 90 (1999) [hereinafter Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act] 
(testimony of Todd F. Gaziano)). 
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
100. Handelsman, supra note 29, at 1895 (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 73–74).
103. Carlos M. Portugal, Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber: The Racial Impact of
Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2003) (citing 
Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971)). 
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their right to vote.104 Like Locke, states believe that once individuals 
break the laws, which they authorized their legislatures to make, they 
abandon the social contract that they have created and, accordingly, 
abandon their right to participate in the democratic process.105 
Proponents believe that felons should be penalized for breaching the 
social contract through felon disenfranchisement.106 Fourth, 
proponents of felon disenfranchisement rely on a morality-based 
rationale and assert that felons have “demonstrated an inherent lack 
of virtue on which the survival of society depends.”107 In essence, 
they fear that felons will not vote in “accordance with the common 
good” or with society’s best interest in mind.108 
III. THE ACCEPTANCE OF A FIRST AMENDMENT APPROACH
 IN OTHER VOTING RIGHTS CASES SUGGESTS THAT 
THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE EMBRACED IN
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT CASES 
Voting restrictions are inconsistent with First Amendment 
values.109 Although interpretations of the First Amendment have not 
yet been expanded to encompass felon disenfranchisement,110 there 
is room to expand the current interpretations.111 Because other voting 
restrictions have been deemed inconsistent with First Amendment 
principles,112 felon disenfranchisement, a more severe voting 
restriction, should also be considered inconsistent with First 
Amendment principles. 
A. First Amendment Values
Political speech is the type of expression that should be 
protected by the First Amendment.113 As the Court discussed in 
104. Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967) (quoting JOHN
LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, in THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 45 (J.W. Gough ed., Barnes & Noble 1966) (1690)). 
105. Id. (quoting LOCKE, supra note 104, at 44).
106. Portugal, supra note 103, at 1321. This Article does not thoroughly analyze this
rationale. 
107. Id. at 1322.
108. Id.
109. See infra Part III.A.
110. See infra Part III.B.
111. See infra Part III.C.
112. See infra Part III.E.
113. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (explaining that
political expression is subject to First Amendment protection). 
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,114 “The First Amendment 
affords the broadest protection to . . . political expression in order to 
‘assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.’”115 This point 
was also articulated in Mills v. State of Alabama,116 where the 
majority agreed that one of the primary purposes of the First 
Amendment was to encourage free discussion about political 
affairs.117 Justice Thomas reiterated this point in a dissent, where he 
emphasized that “[p]olitical speech is the primary object of First 
Amendment protection.”118 
Although political expression is not limited to voting, one of the 
primary ways in which voters express their political views is through 
their right to vote.119 Even though felons are able to express their 
political opinions through petitions and public forums,120 they often 
have an “utter lack of political leverage” because they lack the 
necessary resources to voice their opinion and because of baseless 
stereotypes that make other voters apprehensive of their political 
opinions.121 This is problematic because “competition in ideas and 
governmental policies” is at the heart of what the First Amendment 
was created to protect.122 Moreover, one important function of the 
First Amendment is to protect unpopular speech and to allow an 
unpopular minority to speak out against a majority.123 Leonard W. 
Levy, discussing the values emphasized in the First Amendment, 
explained that “freedom of thought and expression means equal 
freedom for the other fellow, especially the one with hated ideas.”124 
114. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
115. Id. at 346 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
116. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
117. Id. at 218.
118. Stewart Jay, The First Amendment: The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free
Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 773, 777 (2008) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Although Justice Thomas made this 
point in a dissenting opinion, Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the dissent. 533 U.S. at 465. 
119. Lynn Eisenberg, States as Laboratories for Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon
Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 554 (2012). 
120. Id. at 554 n.89 (citing KEYSSAR, supra note 25, at 308) (explaining that the ability to
influence elections will be “significantly limited by resources and public opinions”). 
121. Id. (citing KEYSSAR, supra note 25, at 308).
122. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
123. Donnelly, supra note 22, at 328–30.
124. James G. McLaren, The “Primacy” of the First Amendment: Does It Have a
Justification in Natural Law, History, and Democracy?, 5 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEG. STUD. 45, 49 
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However, when states deny felons the opportunity to vote because 
they fear that felons might express ideas that states disfavor, they do 
exactly what the First Amendment sought to prevent⎯they silence 
the individuals with “hated ideas.”125 
B. Reliance on Other Judicial Approaches to Felon
Disenfranchisement Does Not Make a
First Amendment Approach Inappropriate
Because courts have steadfastly analyzed challenges to felon 
disenfranchisement under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act126 and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,127 courts 
have not fully considered a First Amendment analysis of felon 
disenfranchisement. For example, many courts have overlooked the 
argument that this Article advances—that felon disenfranchisement 
violates the First Amendment.128 However, this does not preclude 
courts from using a First Amendment approach. In fact, in many 
cases where a First Amendment approach was suggested, courts have 
not deemed such approaches inappropriate but have instead resolved 
the cases based on other theories. 
For example, in Farrakhan v. Locke,129 the district court relied 
upon the holding in Richardson v. Ramirez and never reached the 
First Amendment claim.130 In Richardson, the Court held that the 
felon-disenfranchisement statute was not inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause because the Constitution “affirmative[ly] 
sanction[s]” felon disenfranchisement statutes by discussing how to 
apportion electoral votes in the event of disenfranchisement.131 
Citing Richardson, the court in Farrakhan held that it would be 
contradictory for a felon-disenfranchisement statute to be considered 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment when it is affirmatively 
(1994/1995) (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY 
AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 7, 18 (1963)). 
125. Id.
126. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
127. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974). Because this Article focuses on the First
Amendment, it does not thoroughly discuss the arguments under section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act and the Equal Protection Clause, nor does it examine court holdings under such approaches. 
128. Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights
Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (1985). 
129. 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997).
130. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
131. Id.
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sanctioned in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.132 Although 
the court in Farrakhan correctly cited the holding in Richardson,133 
it overlooked the fact that not all felon-disenfranchisement statutes 
can be considered “affirmatively sanctioned” by section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.134 Accordingly, by relying on what other 
courts have deemed an overgeneralization—that all felon 
disenfranchisement statutes are affirmatively sanctioned in section 2 
and are therefore constitutional135—the Farrakhan court failed 
to examine a First Amendment approach to felon 
disenfranchisement.136 The court did not determine whether the 
felon-disenfranchisement statute was inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.137 
Similarly, in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,138 the 
Court stopped short of analyzing freedom of speech in relation to the 
right to vote. The plaintiffs argued that the imposition of poll taxes 
interfered with their First Amendment rights because the taxes 
discouraged, or effectively prevented, certain Virginia residents from 
expressing political opinions through their votes.139 However, the 
Court adjudicated the matter without reaching the First Amendment 
claim.140 The Court did not dismiss the First Amendment claim as 
meritless, but instead explained that the matter could more easily be 
analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.141 This does not preclude the possibility that a First 
Amendment analysis might have been appropriate. 
132. Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314 (citing Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54).
133. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54–56.
134. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 32 (2009) (explaining that Richardson “does not hold
that a state felon disenfranchisement law may never raise equal protection concerns”); see also 
Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985)) (“Nothing in Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment grants states unfettered discretion to disenfranchise felons, much less permits felon 
disenfranchisement on the basis of race.”). Notably, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not expressly declare that states can abridge this right, but instead gives states instructions about 
limiting representation if they choose to abridge individuals’ rights. Id. 
135. Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 26–27 (3d. Cir. 1983) (“It has not been seriously
contended that Richardson precludes any equal protection analysis when the state legislates 
regarding the voting rights of felons.”). 
136. Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1314.
137. Id.
138. 383 U.S. 663 (1996).
139. Id. at 665.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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C. Evolving Interpretations: Room for Growth
Interpretations of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment 
have evolved since its adoption in 1791.142 For example, the First 
Amendment now protects blasphemy, profanity, and commercial 
advertising, which were all traditionally unprotected forms of 
speech.143 Accordingly, even where something historically is not 
seen as a violation of the First Amendment, such as felon 
disenfranchisement,144 this does not serve as a complete bar to the 
possibility that it is unconstitutional.145 As interpretations of the First 
Amendment continuously evolve,146 courts are not precluded from 
revisiting how to interpret the First Amendment’s applicability to 
felon disenfranchisement.147 Additionally, a First Amendment 
approach to felon disenfranchisement does not require significant 
divergence from established interpretations of the First Amendment 
because this approach has been utilized in other voting rights 
cases.148 
D. A Vote Can Be Considered Expression in Some Instances
Because of precedent, especially the Court’s decision in Burdick
v. Takushi,149 it has become challenging to equate the right to vote
with the type of speech protected by the First Amendment. In
142. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1717–18
(1991) (explaining that courts did not really “recognize a constitutional prohibition on 
censorship” until the 1930s); see also J. Matthew Miller III, Comment, The Trouble with 
Traditions: The Split over Eldred's Traditional Contours Guidelines, How They Might Be 
Applied, and Why They Ultimately Fail, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 91, 108 (2008) 
(“[T]radition has not historically restricted application of the First Amendment.”). 
143. Miller, supra note 142, at 108.
144. See Calhoun, supra note 128, at 550–51 (asking why “courts in general, and the Supreme
Court in particular, [have] failed to develop a sophisticated first amendment analysis of individual 
rights in distributional voting rights controversies”); see also George Brooks, Felon 
Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 861–73 
(2005) (emphasizing that challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes have traditionally been 
argued under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act). 
145. Cf. Miller, supra note 142, at 108–09 (explaining that because the First Amendment has
evolved to protect previously unprotected types of speech, copyright should not be excluded from 
the First Amendment’s purview). 
146. Id. at 108.
147. Just as Miller explained that copyright should not be excluded from First Amendment
review on the basis of tradition, felon disenfranchisement statutes should not be excluded either. 
See id. at 108–09. 
148. See infra Part III.D.
149. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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Burdick, the Court held that a prohibition on write-in voting did not 
violate the petitioner’s First Amendment rights.150 As Justice 
Kennedy explained in his dissenting opinion, the majority reasoned 
that “the purpose of casting, counting, and recording votes [was] to 
elect public officials, not to serve as a general forum for political 
expression.”151 The Court added that the ballot’s intended purpose 
was to “winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates,” 
and declared that the ballot was not a place to express “short-range 
political goals, pique, or personal quarrel[s].”152 The Burdick Court 
did not discuss the right to select a specific candidate listed on a 
ballot, but instead discussed the right to write down the names of 
candidates that were not present on the ballot after being given the 
opportunity to nominate them earlier in the election process.153 
However, the Burdick Court overlooked the fact that the right to 
vote, in the abstract, is not the type of political speech exempted 
from First Amendment protection.154 Although no cases directly 
support this contention, an analysis of Burdick’s facts and the factors 
that led to the Court’s decision, as well as an examination of other 
voting rights cases analyzed under the First Amendment, 
demonstrate that a vote can be considered speech protected by the 
First Amendment in some instances.155 
First, Burdick does not support the assertion that a vote is not 
expression in felon disenfranchisement cases. The circumstances in 
Burdick are distinguishable from those in felon disenfranchisement 
cases because the state prohibited all voters from writing in the 
names of candidates.156 In contrast, felons are seeking the right to use 
the ballot in a manner that the state authorizes for other qualified 
voters. Because a state cannot fear that a ballot will turn into a forum 
for political expression when voters are just selecting a candidate or 
following the state’s voting instructions, there is no reason why a 
vote in this sense cannot be considered protected expression. A ballot 
can turn into a forum for political expression only when voters can 
150. Id. at 430.
151. Id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 438 (majority opinion) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974))
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
153. See id. at 436.
154. See discussion infra Parts III.D, III.E.
155. See discussion infra Parts III.D, III.E.
156. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 443–44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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write whatever they choose on a ballot.157 A ballot cannot turn into a 
forum for general expression when voters are restricted to choosing 
between listed candidates. Furthermore, by selecting candidates in a 
manner that the state authorizes for all other qualified voters, felons 
would be using the ballot for its intended purpose⎯to select 
candidates⎯and not as a general forum of political expression. 
Second, courts have the power to recognize that voting is a form 
of expression that should be protected by the First Amendment. 
According to Burdick, the asserted purposes of the election process 
include the ability to contribute to the process of electing officials158 
and the ability to winnow out other candidates from the election 
race.159 These activities should be protected by the First Amendment 
freedom of speech. It is the ability to express political opinions and 
ideals through a regulated voting process that should be recognized 
as a right consistent with the First Amendment, not the ability to use 
the ballot in whichever way a person deems appropriate. When 
courts analyze situations in which voters are unable to vote in a way 
that the state endorses under the First Amendment, they are not 
suggesting that the ballot should turn into a forum to express general 
concerns with the political process. Instead, proposing that the right 
to vote in a way that the state endorses should be examined under the 
First Amendment suggests that individuals should be able to use the 
ballot for its intended purpose⎯to vote for a candidate that is present 
on the ballot. When the ballot is used for this purpose, the ballot will 
not turn into a forum for general expression. Voting for a candidate 
on a ballot, unlike writing down the name of a candidate at the last 
minute when given the opportunity to do so earlier in the political 
process, does not threaten the integrity of a state’s democratic 
system.160 Because states have the right to regulate their voting 
processes,161 they can restrict write-in voting. But, once a state 
denies the right to vote to felons who are otherwise qualified to vote 
and would comply with state voting regulations, such a denial 
severely interferes with felons’ right to freedom of speech. 
157. See id. at 445. Because Hawaii banned write-in voting, the Court could not have
reasonably been concerned with voters using the ballot to express general political beliefs and 
concerns. Id. at 446–47. 
158. Id. at 445.
159. Id. at 438 (majority opinion) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1973)).
160. Id. at 441.
161. Id. at 433.
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Third, denying felons the opportunity to vote goes far beyond 
what the Court in Burdick tried to prevent. In Burdick, the Court held 
that the ballot was not a place to express “short-range political goals, 
pique, or personal quarrel[s].”162 However, many felons are not 
trying to express such short-range political goals, but rather goals 
that they have wished to voice in numerous previous elections and 
goals that many of them will never have the opportunity to voice.163 
Unlike other cases in which voters will have an opportunity to vote 
in other elections within the next four years, most felons are 
prevented from voting on a long-term basis.164 In such cases, in 
which speech is often “chilled or prevented altogether,” courts have 
held that a First Amendment analysis is appropriate.165 
Additionally, other courts have left open the possibility that an 
inability to write in the name of a candidate when voting can be a 
violation of the First Amendment if the state usually provides “space 
on the ballot for write-in voting in contested primary elections when 
a petition for opportunity to ballot has not been filed.”166 In 
Gelb v. Board of Elections of New York,167 the court held that if 
New York typically allowed for write-in votes despite the fact that 
no petition for opportunity to ballot had been filed, then it is likely 
that denying this right to a certain individual violated that 
individual’s First Amendment rights.168 The court certified this 
question for a determination of whether New York typically afforded 
voters this right.169 Gelb supports the proposition that if some voters 
are able to vote in a certain way, then the state must allow other 
voters to vote in this way, instead of arbitrarily drawing 
distinctions.170 According to that line of reasoning, if other voters are 
able to express their political opinions through their votes, felons 
should be able to do so as well. If it might be considered 
unconstitutional to deny the opportunity to effectively write in a 
162. Id. at 438 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 735).
163. See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4 (noting that because many felons are
permanently disenfranchised, most felons are unable to vote in consecutive elections and are 
therefore unable to express long-term goals in addition to their short term goals). 
164. See id.
165. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1178 (11th Cir. 2000).
166. Gelb v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 224 F.3d 149, 150 (2d Cir. 2000).
167. 224 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
168. See id. at 157.
169. Id. at 150.
170. See id.
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candidate on a ballot,171 and the court is willing to consider a vote as 
a type of expression protected by the First Amendment,172 then 
courts should be able to consider a vote as a form of constitutionally 
protected expression if the right to vote is prevented altogether. Thus, 
Burdick does not stand for the proposition that a vote cannot be 
considered a form of constitutionally protected expression in all 
instances. 
E. Examination of First Amendment Analysis Applied to Other
Voting Restrictions: A Starting Point to Suggest a First Amendment 
Analysis for Felon Disenfranchisement Cases 
Although felon disenfranchisement has not explicitly or 
successfully been connected to First Amendment principles, other 
voting rights cases have demonstrated that interferences with the 
right to vote can violate an individual’s First Amendment rights.173 
The similarities between felon disenfranchisement and other voting 
rights cases suggest that these First Amendment arguments should be 
applicable in felon disenfranchisement cases. 
For example, First Amendment approaches have been suggested 
to analyze the constitutionality of poll taxes. Poll taxes can be 
considered similar to felon disenfranchisement because both 
restrictions deny individuals the right to vote due to personal 
characteristics.174 A First Amendment approach was suggested—yet 
never applied—in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, a 
1966 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court deemed poll taxes 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.175 However, in 
United States v. Alabama,176 a 1966 district court case decided three 
weeks after Harper and also concerning the constitutionality of poll 
taxes, the concurrence contextualized the right to vote under the First 
171. Id. at 157.
172. Id. at 157–58. In order to reach the conclusion that petitioner’s First Amendment rights
might have been abridged, the Gelb court had to overcome the Burdick court’s contention that a 
vote is not expression. If the Gelb court agreed that a vote is not expression, its analysis could 
have ended there. Note that Gelb was decided after Burdick. 
173. See discussion infra Part III.E.
174. Poll taxes take away a right because of the personal characteristic of lack of wealth,
whereas felon disenfranchisement takes away a right because of the personal characteristic of 
their status as felons. See J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll 
Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 435, 436–41 (2001) (equating felon disenfranchisement 
to a “21st century version of the poll tax”). 
175. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
176. 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
Spring 2015] FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 727 
Amendment.177 Judge Johnson explained that “[t]he exaction of a tax 
as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the 
First Amendment is as obnoxious as the imposition of a censorship 
or a previous restraint.”178 Additionally, courts have held that other 
voting restrictions abridge individuals’ First Amendment rights and 
specifically interfere with their freedom of speech and association.179 
The following subparts explore judicial approaches to freedom 
of expression and freedom of association claims in voting rights 
cases. Further, these subparts analyze how courts have determined 
whether prior voting restrictions interfered with an individual’s 
First Amendment rights. Ultimately, because courts have held that 
less burdensome voting restrictions interfere with First Amendment 
rights, courts should hold that felon disenfranchisement, a much 
more severe voting restriction, abridges core First Amendment 
values and principles. 
1. Freedom of Speech Approach: Suggesting That
the Vote Can Be Analyzed Under the First Amendment 
In analyzing the right to vote in relation to the First Amendment 
in voting rights cases, courts have implied that a vote can be 
considered a form of expression in some circumstances.180 In doing 
so, courts have limited the implications of Burdick’s holding.181 
For example, in Nader v. Brewer,182 the Ninth Circuit held that a 
residency restriction that prevented non-residents from circulating 
petitions created a severe burden on presidential candidate Ralph 
Nader and his out-of-state supporters’ speech.183 These nominating 
petitions were used only to name and nominate the candidate and ten 
individuals who would serve as electors for that candidate.184 
Petitions might sometimes be considered a better outlet for political 
177. Id. at 108 n.7 (Johnson, J., concurring).
178. Id. (quoting Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
179. See infra Parts III.E.1, III.E.2.
180. See supra Part III.D.
181. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 445 (1992). Burdick held that a ballot’s intended
purpose is not to serve as a general forum of expression. However, in other cases where courts 
analyze the right to vote under the First Amendment, they are implicitly recognizing that a vote is 
a form of constitutionally protected expression. 
182. 531 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).
183. Id. at 1030–31.
184. Id. at 1031.
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expression than a vote in an election because voters are not limited in 
the type of speech that they can express through petitions.185 
However, the petition in Nader could not be used to express 
whatever idea happened to cross supporters’ minds.186 Instead, these 
petitions were used only for nominations.187 Accordingly, these 
petitions for nomination in Nader were very similar to write-in 
voting in Burdick, where voters fought for a right to be able to write 
down the name of a candidate.188 Nothing adequately distinguishes 
what was considered expression protected by the First Amendment 
in Nader189 from what the Court in Burdick adamantly deemed 
unprotected by the First Amendment.190 If the regulations on 
nominating petitions in Nader, which were considered inconsistent 
with First Amendment principles,191 cannot be distinguished from 
the regulation of write-in voting in Burdick,192 there is no support for 
the argument that a vote cannot be equated with expression. 
Similarly, in Chandler v. City of Arvada,193 the court held that a 
city ordinance that limited the ability to circulate petitions to 
residents and qualified voters194 interfered with nonresidents’ rights 
to freedom of speech.195 The ordinance regulated who could circulate 
a petition, not what individuals could express in a petition.196 
Accordingly, because it is difficult to distinguish a restriction on who 
can circulate petitions from a restriction on who can vote for certain 
candidates, the two should not be treated differently. If a regulation 
on who can circulate a petition is subject to First Amendment 
analysis,197 a regulation on who can vote should certainly be subject 
to a First Amendment analysis. 
Additionally, in his concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer,198 Justice 
Kennedy suggested that a First Amendment analysis was proper to 
185. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988).
186. Nader, 531 F.3d at 1031.
187. Id.
188. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430–31 (1992).
189. Nader, 531 F.3d at 1036.
190. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
191. Nader, 531 F.3d at 1036.
192. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
193. 292 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2002).
194. Id. at 1239.
195. Id. at 1244.
196. Id. at 1239.
197. Id. at 1241.
198. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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determine whether a redistricting scheme was constitutional.199 
Vieth involved a claim by Democratic plaintiffs that the 
Republican-controlled Pennsylvania General Assembly 
unconstitutionally created “meandering and irregular” districts by 
gerrymandering the districts for the election to favor Republican 
candidates.200 The plurality criticized a First Amendment approach 
that would require courts to determine whether a burden on political 
speech is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.201 
The plurality feared that this would invalidate any considerations of 
political affiliation when redistricting.202 Justice Kennedy explained 
that a First Amendment analysis would only be employed where a 
group’s representational rights were burdened.203 He did not reach a 
final conclusion on this matter, but he did recognize that burdens on 
individuals’ rights of expression implicated First Amendment values 
and principles.204 Although Justice Kennedy concluded that there 
were no standards to determine the effect of the redistricting and the 
resulting burden on voters’ rights,205 he recognized that minimizing 
the political power of the Democratic Party through redistricting was 
burdensome.206 If analyzed under a First Amendment perspective, 
this redistricting scheme interfered with the voters’ abilities to 
express their political preferences by choosing a particular candidate 
because redistricting would result in “chang[ing] the candidates the 
voter [could] choose from.”207 This is comparable to felon 
disenfranchisement, which interferes with felons’ abilities to express 
their political preferences through their votes. 
First Amendment concerns have also recently been raised in 
response to restrictions on individuals’ abilities to discuss and swap 
their votes through online mediums.208 During the 2000 election, a 
coalition of Ralph Nader supporters agreed to vote for Al Gore in 
199. Id. at 314–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 272–73 (plurality opinion).
201. Id. at 294.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 317.
206. See id. at 316.
207. Timothy D. Caum II, Partisan Gerrymandering Challenges in Light of Vieth v.
Jubelirer: A First Amendment Alternative, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 287, 319 (2005). 
208. See Marc John Randazza, The Other Election Controversy of Y2k: Core First
Amendment Values and High-Tech Political Coalitions, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 143, 146–53 (2004). 
730 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:703 
contested states if voters in uncontested states would vote for 
Nader.209 This would accomplish two mutually beneficial goals. 
First, the vote-swapping practice would help Nader receive 5 percent 
of the popular vote so that he would receive federal matching funds 
in the 2004 election.210 Next, Gore would receive more votes, 
preventing George W. Bush from being elected.211 In response, 
California and Oregon penalized vote-swapping.212 The ACLU filed 
suit in federal court seeking an injunction against these penalties 
because of the “First Amendment implications” of California 
Secretary of State Bill Jones’ decision to implement them.213 The 
judge twice denied the injunction,214 but the denials were later ruled 
an abuse of discretion.215 Although the First Amendment issue in this 
particular case was not reached before the election, articles written 
on this case discussed the clear infringements on voters’ core 
First Amendment rights when voters’ political opinions were 
silenced because of the penalties they would face when voicing 
these opinions.216 Political expression deserves the utmost 
First Amendment protection regardless of whether the political 
expression is through an online medium or through an individual’s 
vote. 
The effects of the statutes discussed in the aforementioned 
voting rights cases are nearly identical to the effect of 
felon-disenfranchisement statutes. Restrictions on the amount of 
people that can circulate petitions and on the ability to vote for 
particular candidates217 are analogous to the restrictions on felons’ 
right to vote. Additionally, restrictions on individuals’ abilities to 
express their political opinions and swap votes through an online 
medium218 are analogous to restrictions on felons’ abilities to express 
their political opinions through their votes. Because of these 
209. Id. at 147–48.
210. Id. at 206–07.
211. See id. at 149 (explaining that Nader supporters would have preferred a Gore
presidency). 
212. Id. at 154.
213. Id. at 174.
214. Id. (citing Porter v. Jones (D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-11700)).
215. Id. at 175 (citing Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 492 (9th Cir. 2003)).
216. See, e.g., id. at 212–13.
217. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272–73 (2004); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law
Found., 525 U.S. 182, 212 (1999); Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Chandler v. City of Arvada, 292 F.3d 1236, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002). 
218. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272–73.
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restrictions, individuals are prevented from expressing their political 
ideals in some way, whether through petition circulation, online 
communication, or voting. The primary difference is that an absolute 
restriction on felons’ abilities to vote in the election is more 
burdensome than the conditional restrictions or partial interferences 
that these other voting restrictions impose.219 Thus, courts should be 
more inclined to recognize that felon disenfranchisement is 
inconsistent with First Amendment values and principles. Further, 
because these cases have conducted First Amendment analyses, they 
have overcome the contention that a vote cannot be analyzed as a 
constitutionally protected form of expression.220 
2. Freedom of Association Approach
A different First Amendment problem with felon 
disenfranchisement is that it deprives individuals of their freedom to 
associate. Taking away this right, which is related to freedom of 
speech221 and freedom of assembly,222 prevents felons from 
associating with candidates and political parties of their choosing.223 
Although freedom of association is not expressly discussed in the 
First Amendment, courts have held that the “freedom to engage in 
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable 
aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”224 
Other courts have discussed freedom of association as a right derived 
from freedom of assembly, another right guaranteed under the First 
Amendment.225 Specifically, the right to associate with and be a part 
of a political party has been considered a right inextricably related to 
freedom of assembly.226 The Court has referred to this right as a 
First Amendment right to freedom of political association,227 
219. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that felon
disenfranchisement completely deprives felons’ of their right to vote). 
220. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
221. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
222. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975).
223. Cf. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 585 (2005).
224. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
225. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Eccles v. Nelson, 919 So. 2d 658,
661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
226. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
227. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 585.
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establishing that this right is necessarily encompassed within the 
First Amendment. 
Regardless of whether courts consider the freedom of 
association to be a right tied to the freedom of speech or a right tied 
to the freedom of assembly, courts under both approaches have 
recognized that individuals should have the right to “engage in 
political expression and association.”228 Because courts have used 
freedom-of-association approaches to analyze other voting rights 
restrictions, precedent suggests that there is some room for courts to 
analyze voting-related restrictions under the First Amendment. 
In Williams v. Rhodes,229 Ohio’s stringent procedures for 
candidates to get on the ballot were deemed unconstitutional because 
they deprived individuals of their right to associate with particular 
political beliefs and candidates.230 In order for new political parties 
to obtain ballot access in presidential elections under the Ohio 
statute, they needed to obtain “petitions signed by qualified electors 
totaling 15 percent of the number of ballots cast in the last preceding 
gubernatorial election.”231 This, combined with other restrictions, 
made it extremely burdensome for new political parties to appear on 
the ballot.232 The Court explained that “the right to form a party for 
the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept 
off the election ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win 
votes.”233 Accordingly, the State’s burdensome restrictions infringed 
upon individuals’ rights to associate with the parties that were unable 
to gain access to the ballot.234 
Interferences with the freedom to associate have also been 
recognized in voting rights cases. In Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Connecticut,235 the Court held that a closed primary system, which 
mandated that voters in a political party primary be registered as 
members of that political party in order to vote,236 was 
228. Button, 371 U.S. at 431 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250–51
(1957) (plurality opinion)). 
229. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
230. Id. at 31–34.
231. Id. at 24–25.
232. Id. at 25 n.1 (quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 209 F. Supp. 983, 994 (E.D. Ohio
1968)). 
233. Id. at 31.
234. Id.
235. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
236. Id. at 210–11 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-431 (1985)).
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unconstitutional because it violated the petitioner’s right to freedom 
of association.237 The Republican Party wanted independent voters to 
have the opportunity to vote in the Republican primary, but because 
these independent voters were not affiliated with any party, they 
were unable to vote.238 The Court recognized that freedom of 
association encompassed “partisan political organization.”239 Here, 
because unaffiliated persons were not able to vote for particular 
candidates, they were denied the opportunity to affiliate and join 
together with any party “in furtherance of common political 
beliefs.”240 
Similarly, in Kusper v. Pontikes,241 the plaintiff was denied her 
right to associate with particular candidates when she was prevented 
from voting in a 1972 Democratic primary because she had voted in 
a 1971 Republican primary.242 The Illinois statute at issue required a 
twenty-three-month waiting period during which individuals could 
not vote in the primary of any political party if they had voted in a 
prior primary of a different political party.243 Accordingly, the 
plaintiff was locked into a political party for a certain period of 
time.244 Because the state’s law regulated “an area so closely 
touching our most precious freedoms,” the court held that impeding 
the freedom to associate with a particular political party was 
unconstitutional.245 
Similarly, in Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin 
ex rel LaFollette,246 the Court held that a rule that provided that 
“only those who [were] willing to affiliate publicly with the 
Democratic Party may participate in the process of selecting 
delegates to the Party’s National Convention”247 violated voters’ 
rights of freedom of association.248 The law required individuals who 
237. Id. at 211.
238. See id. at 212–13.
239. Id. at 214 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
240. Id. (citing Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981)). 
241. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
242. Id. at 52–53.
243. Id. at 52.
244. Id. at 57.
245. Id. at 58–59.
246. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
247. Id. at 109.
248. Id. at 125–26.
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“ha[d] stated their affiliation with the [Democratic] Party” to vote in 
accordance with the results of the open primary election.249 
Accordingly, at the National Convention, representatives would be 
chosen through a process in which only those previously associated 
with the Democratic Party could participate.250 Because the rule 
limited the ability of voters to associate with certain candidates if 
they failed to previously and publicly associate with the Democratic 
Party, the rule violated their freedom of association.251 
Ultimately, the Court has recognized that voting restrictions 
often interfere with voters’ rights to freely associate with a political 
party. Like other voting restrictions, felon disenfranchisement 
restricts felons’ opportunities to affiliate themselves with a particular 
political party through their votes. However, felons’ rights to 
freedom of association are not just restricted—their rights are 
completely denied. Whereas other voting restrictions present an 
obstacle to individuals’ abilities to associate with a particular party 
by requiring prior political affiliation or imposing other 
requirements, felon disenfranchisement creates a complete barrier by 
denying felons their right to vote altogether. Felon 
disenfranchisement gives felons absolutely no opportunity to 
meaningfully associate with any political party. Such restrictions 
unquestionably interfere with the values of the First Amendment, 
which include giving individuals the right to associate with political 
parties of their choosing. 
F. Test for a Constitutional Challenge to a State Election Law
Burdening the Right to Vote 
Courts recognize that states must enact some voting restrictions 
to help the voting process run smoothly,252 but they also realize that 
these restrictions cannot overwhelmingly burden voters’ 
constitutional rights.253 Because of these competing interests, courts 
conduct a balancing test by “weigh[ing] ‘the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments . . .’ against ‘the precise interests put 
249. Id. at 112.
250. Id. at 109.
251. Id. at 125–26.
252. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
253. Id. at 738 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
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forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its 
rule.’”254 In doing so, the courts take “into consideration ‘the extent 
to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights.’”255 If a voting restriction severely burdens an individual’s 
constitutional rights, the restriction is subject to strict scrutiny, and 
the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.”256 Because the First Amendment is a 
fundamental right, a First Amendment intrusion can typically only be 
justified by a compelling state interest.257 
The Court in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation258 suggested that a restriction on “core political speech” 
will generally be considered a sufficiently severe burden that 
requires the Court to conduct a strict scrutiny analysis.259 However, if 
the restriction does not severely burden First Amendment rights and 
instead interferes only slightly with these rights, the state does not 
need to demonstrate a compelling interest and instead needs only to 
cite a legitimate interest.260 For example, despite the fact that the 
right to freedom of association is a fundamental right,261 the Court 
does not always examine voting restrictions that burden associational 
rights under a strict scrutiny analysis.262 In Clingman v. Beaver,263 
the Court held that a law that only minimally burdened voters’ rights 
did not need to be analyzed with strict scrutiny.264 Under Oklahoma 
law, a political party could only invite “registered members” of a 
particular political party and voters registered as Independents to 
vote in its primary.265 Because the law did not require Independents 
to affiliate with a party, the Court held that this restriction was only 
254. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). 
255. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
256. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
257. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
258. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
259. Id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the principle that state interferences with a
fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to serve important state interests). 
260. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 587 (2005); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972). 
261. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
262. Clingman, 544 U.S. at 586–87.
263. 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
264. Id. at 593.
265. Id. at 584–85.
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minimally burdensome.266 Further, since the state had an interest in 
maintaining political parties as “viable and identifiable interest 
groups” and in “insuring that the results of a primary election . . . 
accurately reflect[ed] the voting of the party members,” the Court 
held that this interest was sufficient to justify the minimal burden.267 
Similarly, in Burdick, the Court held that the voting restriction 
was not subject to a strict scrutiny analysis268 because the 
infringement on the petitioner’s rights was minimal—the petitioner 
had the opportunity to vote for the candidate earlier in the election 
process.269 When considering state interests, the Court gave “little 
weight to ‘the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in 
making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot 
status.’”270 Hence, although the conclusion in Burdick is acceptable, 
it was reached for the wrong reason. The conclusion that the voting 
regulation in Burdick was constitutional should have been reached 
purely because the regulation was minimally burdensome, not 
because of the Court’s overgeneralization that casting a vote is not 
the type of expression protected by the First Amendment.271 
However, when the burden on First Amendment rights is direct 
and substantial, courts do employ a strict-scrutiny analysis to make 
sure that the law or regulation is narrowly tailored to a compelling 
state interest.272 For example, in Nader and Chandler, the Court 
considered the challenged restrictions sufficiently burdensome to 
subject them to a strict-scrutiny analysis.273 Accordingly, because 
felon disenfranchisement qualifies as a severe burden on felons’ First 
Amendment rights, courts will have to determine whether it is 
justified by a compelling state interest. The burden on felons’ 
freedom of expression, where felons have no opportunity to express 
their political opinions through voting, is far more severe than the 
burden on freedom of expression in Nader, Vieth, Chandler, and 
Buckley, where individuals could still express their opinions through 
266. Id. at 592.
267. Id. at 594–95 (quoting Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976), aff’d,
429 U.S. 989 (1976)). 
268. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
269. Id. at 437, 440.
270. Id. at 437 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)).
271. See supra Part III.D.
272. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
273. Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008); Chandler v. City of Arvada, 292
F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2002).
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voting, despite burdensome restrictions.274 Additionally, a 
disenfranchised felon’s right to associate with a particular political 
party is impeded far more than an individual’s right to associate in 
Tashjian or Democratic Party of the United States, where individuals 
could still associate with a party as long as they registered or 
previously and publicly associated with a particular party.275 Felons, 
on the other hand, are not given any opportunity to associate with a 
particular party through their vote during the period of their 
disenfranchisement.276 
Unlike Kusper, where an individual could not vote in the 
primary election of a political party if she voted in the primary 
election of a different political party within the preceding 
twenty-three months,277 felons have no opportunity to associate with 
any political party regardless of which party they previously 
associated with. Disenfranchised felons’ associational rights and 
freedom of expression are even further infringed upon than in other 
cases where courts applied strict scrutiny to determine whether such 
a regulation was justified.278 Accordingly, courts, if adopting a 
First Amendment approach, should apply strict scrutiny to felon 
disenfranchisement statutes.  
Because the burden on felons’ freedom of speech or association 
is severe, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
state interest in order to justify such a substantial intrusion on felons’ 
rights.279 However, as demonstrated in Part IV, the interest often 
cited by state and federal governments—that they do not trust how 
felons may vote—cannot justify this significant interference and falls 
far short of this exacting standard.280 
274. See Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267
(2004); Chandler v. City of Arvada, 292 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2002); Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
275. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986); Democratic Party of
the U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 109 (1981). 
276. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Denying felons their
right to vote altogether implicitly denies them their right to associate. Id. 
277. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 52 (1973).
278. See supra Part III.E.1–2.
279. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992).
280. See infra Part IV.
738 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:703 
IV. “WE DO NOT TRUST FELONS”: A RATIONALE INCONSISTENT
WITH THE VALUES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Because of the lack of explicit precedent supporting the 
argument that felon disenfranchisement is inconsistent with First 
Amendment principles, this Article does not end with that analysis. 
Rather, this Article goes on to discuss how First Amendment values 
suggest that the rationale cited for disenfranchising felons—that 
states do not trust felons—is inconsistent with the rationale originally 
cited in support of implementing the First Amendment. This part 
compares the rationale cited for felon disenfranchisement with the 
rationales once cited for previous voting restrictions. It criticizes the 
underlying justification for distrusting felons: that felons will vote 
unfavorably. To support this criticism, this part demonstrates that 
similar rationales have been considered unconstitutional in other 
voting rights cases. Further, this part explains that the states’ 
fear-based rationale is not legitimate and is in no sense a compelling 
interest to justify the extreme burden on felons’ freedom of speech 
and freedom of association. 
A. Comparing the Rationale Cited to Support Early Voting
Restrictions with the Rationale Cited to Support 
Felon Disenfranchisement 
Felon disenfranchisement is comparable to the voting 
restrictions used in the late nineteenth century to circumvent the 
intention of the Fifteenth Amendment because it continues to 
disenfranchise individuals that legislatures do not trust. Historian 
Alexander Keyssar explained that “by blocking laws that 
disenfranchised blacks on the basis of race . . . the Fifteenth 
Amendment had the indirect effect of encouraging election 
‘reformers’ intent on disenfranchising blacks to build up restrictions 
of other kinds.”281 Examples of these state-created restrictions were 
poll taxes and literacy tests. Similarly, felon disenfranchisement is a 
mechanism that denies allegedly untrustworthy282 individuals the 
right to vote. More specifically, some have argued that felon 
disenfranchisement is a mechanism used to abrogate the intention of 
the Fifteenth Amendment by indirectly disenfranchising minority 
281. Fishkin, supra note 25, at 1341 (citing KEYSSAR, supra note 25, at 105–71).
282. See Ewald, supra note 27, at 110.
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groups.283 Representative James G. Blaine believed that felon 
disenfranchisement statutes were an attempt to disguise the true 
intention of the states: to prevent African Americans from voting.284 
He elaborated that the goal was to “depriv[e] the South of the 
representation which is based on the colored population.”285 This 
rationale is consistent with previous concerns that African Americans 
might vote in an unfavorable way, which were cited to support prior 
voting restrictions.286 Because the United States has removed these 
prior voting restrictions,287 it should also discard this flawed rationale 
as a basis for disenfranchising felons. 
In another example that demonstrates this disenfranchisement 
based on distrust, the Alabama legislature passed a broad felon 
disenfranchisement statute in 1901 with the intent to discriminate 
against African Americans.288 At the convention where the Alabama 
constitution was adopted, delegates repeatedly admitted that they 
were “interested in disfranchising blacks and not interested in 
disfranchising whites.”289 Although the statute, which 
disenfranchised individuals who had committed crimes of “moral 
turpitude,”290 was not facially discriminatory, it had a discriminatory 
effect because it resulted in the disenfranchisement of a 
disproportionate number of African Americans.291 In Hunter v. 
Underwood,292 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional.293 Nevertheless, the statute’s wording,294 and the 
legislative history,295 establishes that felon disenfranchisement 
283. George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 125–26 (1961). 
284. Id. at 95.
285. Id. This statement from a Maine legislator is particularly important considering that
Maine is one of the only two states that allow incarcerated individuals to vote. 
286. See supra Part II.B.
287. See supra Part II.B (examining how African Americans and women obtained the right to
vote and demonstrating that particular voting restrictions, like poll taxes and literacy 
requirements, have been deemed unconstitutional). 
288. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985).
289. Id. at 231.
290. Id. at 223.
291. Id. at 227.
292. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
293. Id. at 233.
294. Id. at 223 (citing ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182) (disenfranchising individuals who
committed crimes of “moral turpitude”). 
295. Id. at 229 (quoting 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
THE STATE OF ALABAMA, May 21st, 1901 to September 3rd, 1901, p. 8 (1940)) (demonstrating 
740 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:703 
statutes can be, and often are, created to discriminate against certain 
minority groups. 
Even where no discriminatory intent exists, racial bias in the 
criminal justice system contributes to the racially discriminatory 
effect of felon disenfranchisement statutes.296 The disproportionate 
amount of affected minority groups indicates that state legislatures’ 
fear of the way that felons vote might be better characterized as a 
fear of the way that certain minority groups will vote.297 The 
discriminatory effect, often coupled with the discriminatory intent of 
state legislators, indicates that there is good reason to question the 
rationale for disenfranchising felons. Moreover, this rationale is 
oddly reminiscent of the rationale cited for denying African 
Americans, women, and non-property owners the right to vote—a 
rationale already deemed insufficient to uphold these restrictions.298 
While it is problematic to deny felons the right to vote because states 
do not trust felons, it is even more problematic to deny felons the 
right to vote because states do not trust African Americans and other 
minority groups or individuals with low socioeconomic status. Such 
discrimination has already been deemed unconstitutional299 and is 
especially problematic because minority groups are already less 
likely to be represented in the political process.300 
Even without any indication that state legislatures intend to 
disenfranchise minority groups through felon disenfranchisement 
statutes, it is still problematic to disenfranchise felons because state 
legislatures fear that they will vote for a particular political party or 
platform or that they will vote in a manner inconsistent with the 
goals of an orderly society. While state legislatures never explicitly 
state this fear, they do express the fear that felons might vote for 
candidates or platforms that penalize crimes more leniently or 
that testimony indicated that the delegates’ purpose at the all-white convention was to “establish 
white supremacy in [the] [s]tate” of Alabama). 
296. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2003).
297. See, e.g., id. (considering racial biases in the criminal justice system as one factor in
determining whether felon disenfranchisement statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause, 
which demonstrates that this factor is indicative of whether these statutes are discriminatory). 
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that
legislation affecting minority groups might be more suspect because minorities are less likely to 
be represented in the political process). 
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legalize those criminal activities altogether.301 This mirrors silencing 
individuals’ votes because they might vote for a particular party or 
platform. It is the underlying fear of the way that people will vote 
and the desire to silence these votes because of that fear that is 
problematic and inconsistent with the Constitution. 
B. Criticism of the Distrust-Based Rationale
The concern that felons will vote in an unfavorable way has 
been referenced in U.S. Supreme Court opinions and has been 
expressed by state and federal legislators.302 For example, when 
faced with House Bill 906 during the Civil Participation and 
Rehabilitation Act of 1999—legislation that would have given 
ex-felons the right to vote in federal elections—legislators voiced 
concerns that felons would vote in a problematic way.303 Todd 
Gaziano, a member of the Heritage Foundation, feared that felons’ 
interests conflicted with the interests of law-abiding citizens.304 Even 
the President of the Center for Equal Opportunity, an organization 
that strives to obtain equality, agreed with this rationale and has 
characterized felons as untrustworthy, disloyal, and incapable of 
voting in a way that mirrors the goals of the United States.305 
This rationale based on fear of felons’ viewpoints is both 
unsupported by and inconsistent with constitutional principles. States 
enforcing this rationale either believe that: (1) felons will vote to 
“make legal those illegal acts they wish to commit, or have been 
convicted of committing”306 or that (2) felons do not have a genuine 
interest in the community.307 The first belief that felons will try to 
301. Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967); see also infra
Part IV.B (describing fear as a rationale cited for disenfranchising felons and discussing two 
theories that legislatures cite to support their apprehension with allowing felons to vote). 
302. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
303. Bennett, supra note 7, at ¶ 2 n.4 (citing Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of
1999, supra note 98). 
304. See id. at ¶ 21 n.37 (citing Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act, supra note 98
(testimony of Todd F. Gaziano)). 
305. Id. at ¶ 21 (citing Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act, supra note 98, at 1335
(testimony of Roger Clegg)). 
306. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 4 (citing Jennifer Peter & Holly A. Heyser, Minority Lawmakers Unveil
Several Reform Bills, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 2, 2000, at B4) (explaining that a Virginia 
state senator believed that felons do not alter their judgments after spending time in jail and might 
therefore vote with the same judgments that caused them to commit their respective crimes); see 
also Miller, supra note 94, at 36. 
307. See, e.g., Angela Behrens, Voting-Not Quite A Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 242 (2004) 
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vote to make illegal acts legal is unsupported.308 One study 
demonstrates that incarcerated individuals vote comparably to and 
share political concerns with other American citizens.309 Many 
prisoners understand the wrongfulness of their prior conduct and 
support continued punishment for comparable crimes.310 In fact, 
studies indicate that “[p]eople convicted of crime[s] . . . are far more 
likely to endorse the laws they’ve broken—to ‘accept them as 
desirable guides for life’ than to join together and lobby for abolition 
of the criminal code.”311 Even if “convicts decide[d] to support 
candidates who advocate a more lenient approach to criminal justice, 
such candidates still have to garner enough support among the 
general population in order to prevail, as convicts represent a 
relatively small percentage of the eligible voting population.”312 This 
assumes that there is a candidate advocating a more lenient approach 
to the criminal justice system. 
The generalization that all felons will vote in a certain 
unfavorable way because they lack a substantial interest in the 
community suggests that all felons “share a common political 
viewpoint.”313 This assumption overlooks the fact that not all felons 
will vote in the same way.314 In fact, these stereotypical 
classifications are often not reflective of individuals’ true political 
preferences.315 For example, although most people believe that 
prisoners will vote liberally, studies have demonstrated that many 
prisoners vote conservatively or would vote in this way if given the 
opportunity to vote.316 
(citing Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 172 (2001)) (concluding that 
felons can no longer “be trusted to vote responsibly or to promote the interests of the state”). 
308. Ewald, supra note 27, at 125 (citing Gezari, supra note 27, at 1A).
309. Id.
310. Id. (citing CASPER, supra note 27); see also id. at 126 (quoting GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT 
& ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN FRANCE 121 (Francis Lieber trans., 1964) (1833)) (explaining after touring the 
prisons that, “[t]here [was] a spirit of obedience to the law, so generally diffused in the United 
States . . . even in the prisons”). 
311. Id. at 125–26.
312. Reuven Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again?: U.S. Felon Suffrage: Comparative and
International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 197, 206 (2011). 
313. Miller, supra note 94, at 36.
314. See Ewald, supra note 27, at 125 (discussing the varying political affiliations of
prisoners and the improbability of felons voting a specific way on a single issue). 
315. Id.
316. Id.
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Second, and more importantly, even if society truly fears that 
felons have the capacity to overwhelm the voting process, “that fear 
does not justify the practice of felon disenfranchisement because 
denying citizens the right to vote in order to prevent them from 
voting for certain candidates is repugnant to the Constitution.”317 
Disenfranchised felons have comparable interests to non-felons in 
obtaining the right to vote and participating in the democratic 
process.318 Because felons’ lives are deeply impacted by 
governmental decisions, felons have an interest in voting for 
candidates who will either change or maintain these policies.319 
Accordingly, this substantial interest should not be impeded just 
because felons might vote differently. Such a rationale is misguided 
because voting inherently involves the expression of “biases, 
loyalties, commitments, and personal values.”320 It is because 
individuals want to express their personal opinions that the right to 
vote is extremely coveted.321 
Denying felons the right to vote because they may not vote 
“responsibly” or in a way that promotes state interests is analogous 
to denying felons the right to vote because they might vote for a 
particular candidate. Fear that felons might vote for unpopular ideas 
is not a proper basis for withholding their right to vote. The 
First Amendment was created, in part, to have the opposite effect—
namely, to prevent the silencing of unpopular speech.322 The United 
States’ system of “political liberty does not deprive people of the 
vote because incumbents fear how people will vote.”323 The right to 
vote should not be limited to people who “vote right.”324 Because 
317. Portugal, supra note 103, at 1319–20.
318. See Ewald, supra, note 27, at 132 n.93.
319. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78–79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Memorandum of the Secretary of State of California in Opposition to Certiorari, Class of Cnty., 
Clerks and Registrars of Voters of Cal. v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 904 (1974) (No. 73-324)). 
320. Symposium, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1906 (1999); see Miller, supra note 94, at 35–36. 
321. Eisenberg, supra note 119, at 554 (describing the right to vote as “the most basic form of
political expression”). 
322. Donnelly, supra note 22, at 329.
323. Ewald, supra note 27, at 131 (quoting Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, THE COST
OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 105 (1999)). 
324. R. Gregory Jerald, Comment, Modern Day Discrimination or a Valid Exercise of States’
Rights?: The Circuits Split as to Whether the Federal Voting Rights Act Applies to State Felon 
Disenfranchisement Statutes, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 141, 179 (2005) (quoting FELLNER & 
MAUER, supra note 52, at 15–16). 
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numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases have recognized the flaws with 
this distrust-based rationale when cited to support other voting 
regulations,325 courts should similarly recognize that this rationale is 
flawed when cited to support felon disenfranchisement. 
C. “We Do Not Trust Felons”: A Rationale Inconsistent with the
Values and Principles of the First Amendment
This part discusses voting rights precedent where courts
abandoned distrust-based rationales as unconstitutional. It 
demonstrates that courts and legal scholars have recognized the 
First Amendment implications of such a rationale and suggests that 
this rationale is insufficient to justify an extreme infringement on 
felons’ voting rights. 
1. A Departure from the Distrust-Based Rationale
in Other Voting Rights Cases 
The fact that courts have rejected distrust of individuals as a 
basis for denying voting rights suggests that this rationale must be 
disregarded in felon disenfranchisement cases as well. In 
Carrington v. Rash,326 a Texas law prevented an active member of 
the Armed Forces who “move[d] his home to Texas during the 
course of his military duty from ever voting in any election in that 
State.”327 The State feared that the concentration of military votes in 
one area would influence the majority vote in an unfavorable way.328 
Additionally, the State feared that military personnel did not share 
the same state interests as other citizens because of the “transient 
nature of service in the Armed Forces.”329 The Court held that it was 
“constitutionally impermissible” for states to “fenc[e] out from the 
franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may 
vote.”330 Such a rationale was deemed inconsistent with the 
fundamental notion of a democracy.331 
325. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93–94 (1965) (striking down a voting
restriction because it prevented individuals from voting on the basis that they may have voted in a 
different or unfavorable way). 
326. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
327. Id. at 89 (citing TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 2).
328. Id. at 93.
329. Id. at 94.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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Similarly, in Evans v. Cornman,332 the Court held that a 
restriction preventing voting by individuals who lived on the grounds 
of the National Institutes of Health—a federal enclave within the 
Montgomery County, Maryland—was unconstitutional.333 The State 
feared that these individuals lacked a substantial interest regarding 
electoral decisions.334 The Court explained that denying individuals 
the right to vote because of a lack of a “substantial interest” might be 
another way of expressing that a state is denying individuals the right 
to vote because they have a “different interest.”335 
The Court in Kramer v. Union Free School District336—where a 
New York statute implemented restrictions on eligible voters in an 
attempt to “limit the franchise to those ‘primarily interested’ in 
school affairs”—reached a similar conclusion.337 Although not 
expressly stated in the opinion, the Court essentially equated denying 
the right to vote to individuals who were not “primarily interested” 
with denying the right to vote to individuals who had different 
interests.338 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court struck down the 
restrictions as unconstitutional because such restrictions severely 
burdened appellant’s right to vote.339 The Court held that the state’s 
rationale was insufficient to justify the burdensome restriction.340 
Again, in Dunn v. Blumstein,341 the Court held that a different 
voting restriction, a durational residence requirement for Tennessee 
voters, was unconstitutional.342 Tennessee explained that one of its 
interests in implementing this restriction was to garner a constituency 
that would vote intelligibly and with a “common interest in all 
332. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
333. Id. at 419–20.
334. See id. at 422–23.
335. Id. at 423.
336. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
337. Id. at 631.
338. Although the Court in Kramer focused more closely on the tailoring of the restriction to
the asserted state interest than on whether this interest was compelling, the Court also suggested 
that the interest was not compelling by explaining that the appellees failed to offer much 
justification for the burdensome restrictions. Id. at 633. While the Court did not definitively 
decide whether the state’s interest was compelling, id. at 632 n.14, the Court’s holding in Evans, 
decided one year after Kramer, suggests that this interest is not compelling, Evans, 398 U.S. at 
419. 
339. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632.
340. Id. at 632–33.
341. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
342. Id. at 359–60.
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matters pertaining to (the community’s) government.”343 Just as the 
Court in Evans held that Maryland’s asserted fear that individuals did 
not have a “substantial interest” was actually a fear of differing 
political interests,344 the Court here concluded that Tennessee’s fear 
that certain individuals lacked “common interests” was likewise a 
fear of differing political interests.345 Since “‘[d]ifferences of 
opinion’ may not be the basis for excluding any group or person 
from the franchise,”346 the Court held that the restriction was 
unconstitutional.347 
Felon disenfranchisement cases have also critiqued the recurring 
state and federal government rationale that certain individuals cannot 
be trusted to vote.348 Despite the holding in Carrington and other 
cases that have abided by its holding, Green v. Board of Elections of 
New York349 cited this same rationale two years later to support New 
York’s felon disenfranchisement statutes.350 While the majority of 
justices in Richardson v. Ramirez351 partially relied on Green to 
uphold a California felon disenfranchisement statute,352 Justice 
Marshall voiced opposition to the use of a rationale based on fear and 
distrust.353 He recognized that the fear that felons might vote 
unfavorably in Green, just like the fear that individuals might lack a 
“substantial interest” in Evans, was just another way of saying that 
felons might have differing political opinions.354 In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice Marshall explained that this rationale did not support 
disenfranchising ex-felons who had already served their sentences 
and parole.355 Citing Carrington, Evans, and Dunn, Justice Marshall 
concluded that a potential for differing opinions was not an adequate 
basis for disenfranchisement and that the use of such a rationale was 
undemocratic.356 He explained that this rationale could have also 
343. Id. at 354.
344. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S 419, 423 (1970).
345. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 355 (quoting Evans, 398 U.S. at 423).
346. Id. (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1969)).
347. Id. at 360.
348. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
349. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967).
350. Id. at 451.
351. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
352. See id. at 53–54.
353. Id. at 82–83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 81–82.
355. Id. at 82–83.
356. Id. at 81–82.
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been cited to disenfranchise marijuana smokers or individuals that 
opposed the repeal of prohibition.357 He believed that targeting a 
certain group and disenfranchising them because they may vote 
unfavorably did not constitute a legitimate government interest in a 
democratic society.358 
Accordingly, precedent in other voting rights cases suggests a 
departure from the distrust-based rationale in the felon 
disenfranchisement context. 
2. Application of First Amendment Principles
to a Distrust-Based Rationale 
While Carrington, Evans, Kramer, and Dunn based their 
outcomes on inconsistencies with certain constitutional provisions 
and democracy,359 the Court did not explicitly mention the 
inconsistencies of the distrust-based rationale with the principles of 
the First Amendment. However, the First Amendment is inextricably 
intertwined with the notion of democracy that the Court in 
Carrington held was jeopardized when states disenfranchised 
individuals because they may have voted differently.360 Carrington 
and its progeny suggest that it is undemocratic for states to cite fear 
of the way that individuals might vote as a rationale for restricting 
voting rights.361 The First Amendment supports the same principle. It 
seeks to protect individuals’ freedom to voice unpopular opinions, 
not to restrict these opinions just because they are unpopular.362 
Further, other federal and state courts have held that restrictions 
based on the fear that certain individuals will vote differently are 
inconsistent with First Amendment principles.363 For example, in 
Sloane v. Smith,364 the court discussed a stringent Pennsylvania 
voting registration procedure allowing applicants to vote only if they 
could produce either a “Pennsylvania driver’s license containing a 
357. Id. at 82–83.
358. Id. at 78–83.
359. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
360. Carrington and its progeny sought to protect the right to express unpopular views,
deeming the obliteration of such rights undemocratic. Id. Similarly, the First Amendment seeks to 
protect the right to express unpopular views, deeming the obliteration of such rights inconsistent 
with the First Amendment. Donnelly, supra note 22, at 329. 
361. Carrington, 380 U.S. at 94.
362. Donnelly, supra note 22, at 329.
363. See, e.g., Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
364. 351 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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Centre County address” or two or more credit cards, bank accounts, 
leases, or other “indicia of business or commercial activity within the 
County.”365 Because the court concluded that the only possible 
rationale of such stringent requirements was to “discourag[e] and 
depriv[e] the students at Pennsylvania State University from 
exercising their right to vote,”366 it held that the requirements had a 
“chilling effect on First Amendment rights.”367 This fear of students 
overwhelming the political process368 likely stemmed from the 
county’s belief that the students would vote in a different and 
potentially “unfavorable” way. The court recognized that silencing 
individuals’ votes because of differences of opinions was 
inconsistent with First Amendment principles.369 
Similarly, in a law review article briefly discussing the rationale 
for felon disenfranchisement as analyzed by the court in Green, the 
author explained that “Judge Friendly surely understood the First 
Amendment effects of basing his opinion on the rationale that certain 
political parties could be excluded from the political process.”370 
Judge Friendly concluded that felon disenfranchisement was 
appropriate for Green because Green was involved in a conspiracy to 
“overthrow” the government.371 He argued that “felon 
disenfranchisement was necessary to prohibit organized crime from 
participating in the election of New York district attorneys and 
judges empowered with hearing the felons’ cases.”372 But even Judge 
365. Id. at 1301.
366. Id. at 1304–05.
367. Id. at 1305.
368. Id. at 1304–05.
369. See id. at 1305.
370. Portugal, supra note 103, at 1320.
371. Green v. Bd. of Elections of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1967).
372. Portugal, supra note 103, at 1320. Judge Friendly seems to be disguising the state’s true
intention, which was to prevent a member of organized crime from voting in a way in which the 
state deemed unfavorable. See Green, 380 F.2d at 447. Despite the state’s disguised intentions, 
this seems contrary to the principles elaborated in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). 
The state is attempting to silence Green’s vote based on the fear that Green might vote in a way to 
facilitate organized crime, Green, 380 F.2d at 447, just as Texas was trying to silence individuals’ 
votes based on a fear that they might vote in an unfavorable way, Carrington, 380 U.S. at 93. 
Perhaps Judge Friendly purposely wrote the opinion in a way that would not clearly abrogate the 
intentions of the First Amendment. As Portugal mentioned, it is possible that Judge Friendly did 
not explicitly discuss the state’s intention to silence particular political opinions because he 
understood the effect that such a rationale would have on the First Amendment. Portugal, supra 
note 103, at 1320. This is especially convincing because this case was decided just two years after 
Carrington. It is also possible that Judge Friendly thought felon disenfranchisement was 
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Green did not suggest that individuals should be denied their right to 
vote purely because they might vote differently or for a particular 
party.373 The analysis of First Amendment implications of the 
distrust-based rationale, while not yet widely accepted, is indicative 
of why this rationale is so problematic and should be critically 
challenged. 
3. No Compelling Interest to Justify the Severe Burden of
Felon Disenfranchisement 
The rationale cited for disenfranchising felons—that state and 
federal governments do not trust felons to vote—is not only 
inconsistent with the First Amendment and democracy, but is also 
not a compelling interest because of such problematic 
inconsistencies. The Court has repeatedly held that where a 
“challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and 
denies the franchise to others, [it] ‘must determine whether the 
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.’”374 
Additionally, because the voting restrictions directly and 
substantially interfere with fundamental First Amendment rights, 
courts should apply a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether 
the state has a compelling interest to justify this severe burden.375 
Even if these restrictions were absolutely necessary to 
accomplish the goal of silencing individuals’ opinions that might 
cause them to vote differently, these restrictions do not promote any 
legitimate state interest, let alone a compelling state interest. It seems 
absurd to think that judges, when formulating the strict scrutiny test, 
intended for a rationale that is inconsistent with the principles of the 
First Amendment and democracy to qualify as a compelling state 
interest. This interest should not even be considered a permissible or 
legitimate state interest376 because it undermines critical First 
appropriate to prevent the organized crime of voting fraud, but not necessarily an appropriate 
punishment for all crimes. Green, 380 F.2d at 447. 
373. Portugal, supra note 103, at 1320 (mentioning that Judge Friendly would have
understood the First Amendment implications of making such an argument). 
374. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)). 
375. See supra Part III.F.
376. Rational basis review, the least stringent level of review, only requires a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976). 
This is an extremely deferential standard. Id. However, as discussed in Rehnquist’s dissenting 
opinion in Zablocki, the interest must be “constitutionally permissible.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
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Amendment and democratic values. Accordingly, when courts are 
confronted with only this rationale, the severe infringement that felon 
disenfranchisement places on felons’ right to vote is not narrowly 
tailored to a compelling governmental interest. This is largely 
because the desire to prevent certain individuals from voting is not a 
compelling interest. Even if it were a compelling interest, felon 
disenfranchisement statutes would not be narrowly tailored to this 
interest because the statutes are oftentimes extremely over- and 
under-inclusive.377 
V. PROPOSAL: AN ANALYSIS OF MAINE AND VERMONT’S APPROACH
DEMONSTRATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH A
DISTRUST-BASED RATIONALE
Because Maine and Vermont do not disenfranchise felons unless
conditioned on a prior voting offense, these states have implicitly 
rejected the constitutionally infirm rationale adopted by other 
states—that felons are untrustworthy and might vote in an 
unfavorable way.378 Maine’s lack of a felon disenfranchisement 
statute and Vermont’s limitation of felon disenfranchisement to 
individuals who have committed election-related offenses379 suggest 
that there is no rationale to support the severe punishment of felon 
disenfranchisement. Maine and Vermont’s lack of blanket felon 
disenfranchisement statutes also indirectly supports the proposition 
that felon disenfranchisement and the states’ rationale that felons 
cannot be trusted to vote are inconsistent with the principles of the 
First Amendment.380 
As discussed in Part II.C, in 1858, 1859, and 1860, James G. 
Blaine, a House of Representatives member in Maine, struggled to 
U.S. 374, 407 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). An interest contrary to First Amendment 
principles cannot even meet rational basis review because it is not “constitutionally permissible.” 
Id. 
377. See supra Part IV.B.
378. See ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 807(a) (2008).
379. Tit. 28, § 807(a).
380. ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; tit. 28, § 807(a). Maine and Vermont did not clearly reject felon
disenfranchisement statutes because the rationale for implementing such statutes was inconsistent 
with the First Amendment. See ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; tit. 28, § 807(a). However, by eliminating 
the statutes, Maine and Vermont implicitly recognized some problems with blanket 
disenfranchisement statutes and the rationales that other states cite to support such statutes. ME. 
CONST. art. II, § 1; tit. 28, § 807(a). Because both states rejected blanket felon disenfranchisement 
statutes, they implicitly discarded all potential rationales as insufficient justifications for the 
severe burden on felons’ rights. ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; tit. 28, § 807(a). 
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find a rationale to support felon disenfranchisement beyond what he 
believed was an attempt to deny individuals in the South 
representation in the election.381 It was during this period that poll 
taxes, literacy tests, and other restrictions were implemented because 
of the concern that African Americans’ interests would align with 
Republican interests.382 Accordingly, the goal that Blaine was citing 
was a goal to silence the voters who would vote in an unfavorable 
way.383 By recognizing that this rationale was problematic and 
declining to implement a voting restriction based on such a rationale, 
Blaine was not expressly asserting that this rationale was inconsistent 
with First Amendment principles.384 However, by disposing of this 
rationale that undermines First Amendment values, Blaine and other 
representatives of Maine rejected the necessity of felon 
disenfranchisement statutes, suggesting that the rationale 
was insufficient to support the implementation of felon 
disenfranchisement statutes.385 
Additionally, Vermont replaced its original felon 
disenfranchisement statute with a statute disenfranchising only those 
who had committed election-related offenses, because the legislature 
believed that its original statute was of “vague and uncertain 
meaning.”386 In doing so, the Vermont legislature implicitly rejected 
the rationale that it does not trust felons with their right to vote.387 
Presumably, the legislature thought that only those individuals who 
had previously committed voter fraud threatened the integrity of the 
election process.388 Therefore, the legislature abstained from broadly 
disenfranchising people that it felt might vote in an unfavorable 
381. See Katherine Shaw, Invoking the Penalty: How Florida’s Felon Disenfranchisement
Law Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population Equality, in Congressional 
Representation, and What to Do About It, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1439, 1464 (2006) (quoting 
Zuckerman, supra note 283, at 95). 
382. Briffault, supra note 59, at 1515–16.
383. Blaine believed that the goal of felon disenfranchisement was to decrease representation
in the South. See Shaw, supra note 381, at 1464 (citing Zuckerman, supra note 283, at 95). This 
is analogous to decreasing representation for fear that individuals in the south might vote in a 
particular way. 
384. Blaine asserted that there was no rationale for disenfranchisement instead of explicitly
considering and rejecting the rationale based on fear because it conflicted with First Amendment 
principles. See id. 
385. See id.
386. See Ewald, supra note 31, at 1063 (quoting Hancock, supra note 44, at 36).
387. See id.
388. Id. (citing Hancock, supra note 44, at 36).
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way.389 The fact that Vermont once had such a broad felon 
disenfranchisement statute and now has an extremely limited statute 
indicates that the legislature recognized that the prior statute lacked 
any sound rationale.390 Both Maine and Vermont likely recognized 
the constitutional problems with disenfranchising felons because 
they might vote unfavorably, and they still do—recent attempts to 
pass felon disenfranchisement legislation have failed.391 Ultimately, 
Maine and Vermont recognize that the current rationale supporting 
other states’ felon disenfranchisement statutes is constitutionally 
infirm and insufficient to justify a severe intrusion on felons’ rights 
to vote. 
While Maine and Vermont are only two states and represent a 
minority approach to felon disenfranchisement, they demonstrate that 
obliterating, or at least narrowing, felon disenfranchisement statutes, 
while somewhat far-fetched, is still attainable.392 Until then, courts 
should take small steps in recognizing the constitutional infirmities 
with felon disenfranchisement and the rationale cited for felon 
disenfranchisement in order to challenge states to really consider 
whether there truly is a reason to disenfranchise felons. 
VI. CONCLUSION: NO RATIONALE SHOULD MEAN
NO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Felon disenfranchisement is a severe intrusion on felons’ 
freedom of speech and expression. Yet, state and federal 
governments have failed to cite legitimate and compelling 
justifications in order to overcome the constitutional infirmities of 
the states’ rationale that felons cannot be trusted to vote.393 Because 
state and federal governments have not stated a proper rationale, they 
have not established a proper basis for disenfranchising felons.394 
Felons at least deserve a constitutionally sound rationale for the 
severe restriction imposed on their right to vote. Because the effect 
389. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 807(a) (2008).
390. See Ewald, supra note 31, at 1063.
391. One Person, No Vote, supra note 41, at 1942 n.21 (citing S.P. 311, 120th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Me. 2001), available at http://janus.state.me.us/legis/bills; H. 286, 2001–2002 Leg. (Vt. 
2001), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2002/bills/intro/H-286.htm). 
392. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
393. See Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence
of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 248, 248 (2000). 
394. Id.
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of felon disenfranchisement is to deny a discrete and insular minority 
the ability to participate in the political process, the rationale 
supporting this restriction should be legitimate and well supported—
not unclear, impermissible, and essentially nonexistent.395 This is 
especially true because when states disenfranchise felons, they are 
depriving two discrete and insular groups of their right to 
vote: felons (who are a minority group unto themselves)396 and racial 
minorities (who comprise a significant percentage of disenfranchised 
felons).397 These discrete and insular minorities are unable to rely on 
the political processes to fix their problems.398 Courts should afford 
special protection to these groups of individuals, rather than prevent 
them from expressing what might be considered an unfavorable 
viewpoint through their votes.399 
Ultimately states and courts have two choices: (1) reconsider 
felon disenfranchisement statutes and question whether the burden 
that states are placing on felons is well-justified when considering 
state interests, or (2) determine whether there is a constitutionally 
sound and well-supported rationale that can take the place of the 
distrust-based rationale, which is inconsistent with constitutional 
principles. 
When courts fail to recognize that felon disenfranchisement and 
the rationale cited for felon disenfranchisement are completely 
inconsistent with First Amendment values and principles and 
continue to disenfranchise felons, they are not affording these 
suspect groups the protection that they deserve. This backwards step 
away from universal suffrage is extremely problematic and hints at 
the historical trend of denying different groups of individuals their 
right to vote because state legislatures feared the way in which these 
individuals would vote. Accordingly, “the only thing we have to fear 
is fear itself.”400 Legislatures, courts, and voters should not be 
concerned with the way that voters might vote, but instead should be 
concerned with the fact that 5.85 million Americans were unable to 
395. Note, Voter and Officeholder Qualifications, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2230, 2250 (2006).
396. See Bailey Figler, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723, 726 (2006). 
397. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, supra note 4.
398. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
399. See id.
400. Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 1.
754 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:703 
vote in November 2012 because of a rationale based on fear—a 
rationale inconsistent with the First Amendment.  
